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In this dialogue between a philosopher and a poet, the authors provide us with
a characterization – and to some degree also a caricature – of the philosopher
and the poet. Having written on two poems in my life -- and these I suspect
were bad ones, and having only a cursory knowledge of poetry based on
classes in English literature pursued more than thirty years ago, I feel rather illequipped to comment on what a poet is and does. I feel better equipped to
comment on the characteristics and role of a philosopher. A philosopher is one
of the things I take myself to be. So in my comments, I will concentrate on the
portrayal of the Philosopher in this dialogue. I’ll discuss the positive, or mostly
positive characteristics attributed to the philosopher; the negative
characteristics so attributed; and the significance of the story of Socrates.
First, positive or predominantly positive characteristics. A Philosopher is a
rational being or at least is trying to be one. He or she values argument and
arguing, both as means of conducting disagreements and as an exploratory
technique aimed at discovering truth. Whether arguing in the course of a
discussion with one or more others or constructing arguments for himself or
herself, a Philosopher is trying to pay service to Reason. We are told that the
Philosopher is a being who makes himself or herself accountable to Reason,
who bows down before Reason, revising arguments and beliefs that turn out to
be unreasonable. What that means is not spelled out in the dialogue. I think it
would mean that the Philosopher tries to construct arguments that are logical
and reasonable. If he or she were to find out that some aspect of the argument
was not reasonable, the Philosopher would give up or revise his or her
argument and the beliefs dependent upon it.
Sometimes Philosophers argue back and forth with the goal of winning, but it is
not necessary that one party in a two-party argument should win. Nor is it
necessary to conduct arguments with this purpose in mind: one may construct
and evaluate arguments as a tool of inquiry, as part of a broader quest for
Truth. The arguments of a Philosopher may be addressed to a specific,
historically situated audience, but ultimately the Philosopher is aiming for the
Universal Audience of rational minds; he or she is not concentrating solely on a
local, concrete dispute. As a Philosopher, one will be sensitive to techniques of
argument but not only to that. Substantive knowledge is required as well. A
Philosopher may be sensitive to image, rhetorical nuances, and even to
emotion and intuition, but his or her main goal will be to employ Reason and
argument in the search for Truth.
Now for some of the negative characteristics of the Philosopher. I hear the
authors as saying not that all philosophers have these characteristics, but that

some or many do. It would be part of their case, I think, that the ambitions and
techniques of the Philosopher make it rather natural and easy to develop these
negative traits. But since I do not hear the authors as saying that these
negatives are essential or intrinsic to the role, I shall speak here of
philosophers, and not of the Philosopher. Philosophers may readily lapse into
word games; we may become too pedantic and stuck on minor logical points,
losing the core of an issue. We may be unwilling to listen to others and too
disputatious and confrontational. We may ignore rhetorical nuances and
emotional and intuitive aspects of knowledge or of issues we are pursuing. We
may ignore the real needs and sensitivities of particular audiences and may be
socially insensitive as to the needs and feelings of those audiences. We may
ask too many questions. We may under-estimate emotion and intuition as
sources of inspiration, curiosity, and even knowledge – and we may underestimate the power and significance of images, stories, and rhetoric when we
are putting forward our case. We may become so captivated by our sense of
Reason, Truth, the capital-P-Philosopher, and the timeless universal Audience
as to be naïve about the contested nature and specific practicalities of the
situation in which we are functioning.
Such preoccupation recalls the ancient story of Thales, the first Western
philosopher, who is said to have fallen into a well as he was walking along
looking up at the sky, pondering the mysteries of the world. Note, however, that
it is no part of this story that Thales was constructing or evaluating an argument
when he took this unfortunate tumble. The story reminds us that philosophers
do not argue all the time. Sometimes they think and wonder.
I have no quarrel with the claims that many philosophers display such
characteristics as confrontationality, pedantry, insensitivity, arrogance, and
metaphysical and practical naivete and that these characteristics are negative.
Indeed, I take such claims to be uncontroversial and will not pursue them further
here. I wish only to emphasize again that I am interpreting the authors as
saying not that such negative features are endemic or intrinsic to the practice
and pursuit of philosophy, but only that they are relatively common among
philosophers.
The positive case, I tend to read as more essentialist, and it is for this reason
that I am more skeptical about it. The very act of constructing a dialogue
between a philosopher and a poet has led the authors to represent The
Philosopher as One Side in a discussion about method and attitudes to the
world. The Philosopher is for most of the dialogue contrasted with the Poet,
who represents the Other Side. Unlike the Philosopher, the Poet does not
value Reason and does not search for Truth. Rather, the Poet seeks to interest
or entertain, takes so little interest in arguments as to be almost incapable of
following them, values stories over Truth, and puts his or her stake in intuition,
feeling, image, art, and story, aiming to entertain or please a particular
audience. Until the reconciliatory moves towards the end of the dialogue, the
Philosopher and the Poet are cast in a dichotomy of Two Sides. Each is what
the other is not. And this necessarily over-simplifies matters – both for poets

and for philosophers, I suspect.
Again, I will concentrate on philosophers. There are philosophers, including
contemporary feminists such as Andrea Nye and Sarah Ruddick, who strongly
value feeling, intuition, listening, and inter-personal skills. There are
philosophers such as Nietzsche and Derrida who question Reason and Truth.
There are philosophers such as the later Wittgenstein who question
universalistic interpretations and insist on importance of context and the details
of particular cases. There are historicist philosophers who would laugh loudly
at any idea of the Universal Audience. The demands of the dialogic art and the
brevity required by this occasion have made the Philosopher an oversimplified and artificially singular figure. The same may be said for Argument,
Reason, and Truth. We do hear a little about different conceptions of
Argument, but Reason and Truth have been reified as clear essences that the
Philosopher is guided by and is aiming toward. There is no acknowledgement
here that Reason and Truth have been many things to many philosophers.
So now for the story of Socrates. For most philosophers, Socrates stands out
as a hero of autonomous, rational inquiry, a questioner par excellence.
According to the philosophers’ story, Socrates was a man who bravely
embodied the truth that the unexamined life is not worth living, a gadly of a
society, pricking with questions that showed the unclarity and inadequacy of
their assumptions about life. This brave hero of ancient Athens was put to
death because of antagonism to his questions. He died for his principles and,
indeed, for the spirit of free and autonomous thinking and inquiry. He defended
the right to raise questions, even embarrassing ones, and to put those
questions to the powerful and important. This story of Socrates was told by
Plato, who had been his pupil and who loved and admired him enormously.
And in philosophy this story amounts to orthodoxy. The Poet in our dialogue
questions philosophical orthodoxy about Socrates, claiming that he was
arrogant and socially insensitive, and that he lost his life because he did not
understand the ways of the world or the particularities of the audiences whom
he was addressing.
The dispute about this story is of course a real one. One place it surfaces – not
in a poem – is in I.F. Stone’s The Trial of Socrates. Stone argues that
Socrates was anti-democratic and elitist and that it was these aspects of his
thought and life that got him into trouble in Athens. He also suggests that for
various reasons including the fact that, at seventy, he was ready to die,
Socrates did not launch the kind of defense that would have served him well.
Socrates, Stone suggests, did not appeal to principles of free speech because
there was a fundamental sense in which he did not fully believe in them.
Socrates did not think that all opinions were of equal merit and equally
deserved to be heard: he did not believe that everything is worth saying. The
status as a philosophical hero, or secular saint, that Socrates enjoys in the
Western philosophical tradition is on this account unwarranted. I.F. Stone
strongly resists Plato’s telling, and Western tradition’s classic re-telling, of the
story of Socrates. People can tell stories in different ways, for different

audiences, and to different ends. This case is well-suited to illustrate the
authors’ final reconciliatory moves in the direction of allowing that stories can
be told in different ways and can be relevant to audiences and arguments in
different ways. A story can give rise to arguments, can be the basis of, or an
important part of, an argument, and give rise to critical discussions just the way
an argument can. These facts will be important for a fuller understanding of the
broader topic suggested by this dialogue – the role of narrative in argument,
and argument in narrative.

